صفحة 324 من 734

Let it be understood then that there are two parts of the Soul

possessed of Reason; one whereby we realise those existences

whose causes cannot be otherwise than they are, and one whereby

we realise those which can be otherwise than they are,[2] (for

there must be, answering to things generically different,

generically different parts of the soul naturally adapted to

each, since these parts of the soul possess their knowledge in

virtue of a certain resemblance and appropriateness in themselves

to the objects of which they are percipients);[3] and let us name

the former, "that which is apt to know," the latter, "that which

is apt to calculate" (because deliberating and calculating are

the same, and no one ever deliberates about things which cannot

be otherwise than they are: and so the Calculative will be one

part of the Rational faculty of the soul).