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[7] The meaning is, that the onus probandi is thrown upon the

person who maintains the distinction, Aristotle has a prima facie

case. The whole passage is one of difficulty. Card wells text

gives the passage from [Greek: dokei de] as a separate argument

Bekker's seems to intend al 81 ir/jd£eis as a separate argument

but if so, the argument would be a mere petitio principii. I have

adopted Cardwell's reading in part, but retain the comma at

[Greek: dmpho] and have translated the last four words as

applying to the whole discussion, whereas Cardwell's reading

seems to restrict them to the last argument.

[8] i.e. on objects of Moral Choice, opinion of this kind is not

the same as Moral Choice, because actions alone form habits and

constitute character, opinions are in general signs of character,

but when they begin to be acted on they cease to be opinions, and

merge in Moral Choice.

"Treason doth never prosper, what's the reason? When it doth

prosper, none dare call it Treason."