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Further, since one is to believe and know the thing by having a

syllogism of the kind called demonstration, and what constitutes

it to be such is the nature of the premisses, it is necessary not

merely to know before, but to know better than the conclusion,

either all or at least some of, the principles, because that

which is the cause of a quality inhering in something else always

inheres itself more as the cause of our loving is itself more

lovable. So, since the principles are the cause of our knowing

and behoving we know and believe them more, because by reason of

them we know also the conclusion following.

Further: the man who is to have the Knowledge which comes through

demonstration must not merely know and believe his principles

better than he does his conclusion, but he must believe nothing

more firmly than the contradictories of those principles out of

which the contrary fallacy may be constructed: since he who

knows, is to be simply and absolutely infallible.

BOOK VII