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Well, Good Counsel is a Rightness of deliberation, and so the

first question must regard the nature and objects of

deliberation. Now remember Rightness is an equivocal term; we

plainly do not mean Rightness of any kind whatever; the ἀκρατὴς,

for instance, or the bad man, will obtain by his calculation what

he sets before him as an object, and so he may be said to have

deliberated rightly in one sense, but will have attained a great

evil. Whereas to have deliberated well is thought to be a good,

because Good Counsel is Rightness of deliberation of such a

nature as is apt to attain good.

But even this again you may get by false reasoning, and hit upon

the right effect though not through right means,[37] your middle

term being fallacious: and so neither will this be yet Good

Counsel in consequence of which you get what you ought but not

through proper means.