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To consider the subject of Pleasure and Pain falls within the

province of the Social-Science Philosopher, since he it is who

has to fix the Master-End which is to guide us in dominating any

object absolutely evil or good.

But we may say more: an enquiry into their nature is absolutely

necessary. First, because we maintained that Moral Virtue and

Moral Vice are both concerned with Pains and Pleasures: next,

because the greater part of mankind assert that Happiness must

include Pleasure (which by the way accounts for the word they

use, μακάριος; χαίρειν being the root of that word).

Now some hold that no one Pleasure is good, either in itself or

as a matter of result, because Good and Pleasure are not

identical. Others that some Pleasures are good but the greater

number bad. There is yet a third view; granting that every

Pleasure is good, still the Chief Good cannot possibly be

Pleasure.

In support of the first opinion (that Pleasure is utterly

not-good) it is urged that: