पुस्तक · Nicomachean Ethics
पृष्ठ 135 / 734
लेखक: Aristotle
समय0:00
गति (WPM)0.0
सटीकता100.0%
स्टार्ट दबाएं और पंक्तियां सटीक टाइप करें। · बैकस्पेस अक्षम — गलती के बाद भी जारी रखें।
Moreover, testimony seems to be borne to these positions both
privately by individuals, and by law-givers too, in that they
chastise and punish those who do wrong (unless they do so on
compulsion, or by reason of ignorance which is not self-caused),
while they honour those who act rightly, under the notion of
being likely to encourage the latter and restrain the former. But
such things as are not in our own power, i.e. not voluntary, no
one thinks of encouraging us to do, knowing it to be of no avail
for one to have been persuaded not to be hot (for instance), or
feel pain, or be hungry, and so forth, because we shall have
those sensations all the same.
And what makes the case stronger is this: that they chastise for
the very fact of ignorance, when it is thought to be self-caused;
to the drunken, for instance, penalties are double, because the
origination in such case lies in a man's own self: for he might
have helped getting drunk, and this is the cause of his
ignorance.
स्टार्ट दबाएं और पंक्तियां सटीक टाइप करें।
शुरू नहीं हुआ