पुस्तक · Nicomachean Ethics
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लेखक: Aristotle
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स्टार्ट दबाएं और पंक्तियां सटीक टाइप करें। · बैकस्पेस अक्षम — गलती के बाद भी जारी रखें।
In the first place, it seems that Anger does in a way listen to
Reason but mishears it; as quick servants who run out before they
have heard the whole of what is said and then mistake the order;
dogs, again, bark at the slightest stir, before they have seen
whether it be friend or foe; just so Anger, by reason of its
natural heat and quickness, listening to Reason, but without
having heard the command of Reason, rushes to its revenge. That
is to say, Reason or some impression on the mind shows there is
insolence or contempt[14] in the offender, and then Anger,
reasoning as it were that one ought to fight against what is
such, fires up immediately: whereas Lust, if Reason or Sense, as
the case may be, merely says a thing is sweet, rushes to the
enjoyment of it: and so Anger follows Reason in a manner, but
Lust does not and is therefore more disgraceful: because he that
cannot control his anger yields in a manner to Reason, but the
other to his Lust and not to Reason at all.
स्टार्ट दबाएं और पंक्तियां सटीक टाइप करें।
शुरू नहीं हुआ