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Nor does that seem to be sound which is urged respecting the

argument from the contrary: I mean, some people say "it does not

follow that Pleasure must be good because Pain is evil, since

evil may be opposed to evil, and both evil and good to what is

indifferent:" now what they say is right enough in itself but

does not hold in the present instance. If both Pleasure and Pain

were bad both would have been objects of avoidance; or if neither

then neither would have been, at all events they must have fared

alike: but now men do plainly avoid the one as bad and choose the

other as good, and so there is a complete opposition.

Nor again is Pleasure therefore excluded from being good because

it does not belong to the class of qualities:[4] the acts of

Virtue are not qualities, neither is Happiness [yet surely both

are goods].

Again, they say the Chief Good is limited but Pleasure unlimited,

in that it admits of degrees.