Libro · Nicomachean Ethics
Pagina 137 di 734
Autore: Aristotle
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As for the plea, that a man did not know that habits are produced
from separate acts of working, we reply, such ignorance is a mark
of excessive stupidity.
Furthermore, it is wholly irrelevant to say that the man who acts
unjustly or dissolutely does not wish to attain the habits of
these vices: for if a man wittingly does those things whereby he
must become unjust he is to all intents and purposes unjust
voluntarily; but he cannot with a wish cease to be unjust and
become just. For, to take the analogous case, the sick man cannot
with a wish be well again, yet in a supposable case he is
voluntarily ill because he has produced his sickness by living
intemperately and disregarding his physicians. There was a time
then when he might have helped being ill, but now he has let
himself go he cannot any longer; just as he who has let a stone
out of his hand cannot recall it,[14] and yet it rested with him
to aim and throw it, because the origination was in his power.
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