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And on this principle acts done from anger are fairly judged not

to be from malice prepense, because it is not the man who acts in

wrath who is the originator really but he who caused his wrath.

And again, the question at issue in such cases is not respecting

the fact but respecting the justice of the case, the occasion of

anger being a notion of injury.[25] I mean, that the parties do

not dispute about the fact, as in questions of contract (where

one of the two must be a rogue, unless real forgetfulness can be

pleaded), but, admitting the fact, they dispute on which side the

justice of the case lies (the one who plotted against the other,

i.e. the real aggressor, of course, cannot be ignorant),[26] so

that the one thinks there is injustice committed while the other

does not.