Strona 369 z 734

And by the distinction between Natural and Matured Virtue one can

meet the reasoning by which it might be argued "that the Virtues

are separable because the same man is not by nature most inclined

to all at once so that he will have acquired this one before he

has that other:" we would reply that this is possible with

respect to the Natural Virtues but not with respect to those in

right of which a man is denominated simply good: because they

will all belong to him together with the one faculty of Practical

Wisdom.

It is plain too that even had it not been apt to act we should

have needed it, because it is the Excellence of a part of the

Soul; and that the moral choice cannot be right independently of

Practical Wisdom and Moral Goodness; because this gives the right

End, that causes the doing these things which conduce to the End.