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A proof of which is that now all, in defining Virtue, add on the

"state" [mentioning also to what standard it has reference,

namely that] "which is accordant with Right Reason:" now "right"

means in accordance with Practical Wisdom. So then all seem to

have an instinctive notion that that state which is in accordance

with Practical Wisdom is Virtue; however, we must make a slight

change in their statement, because that state is Virtue, not

merely which is in accordance with but which implies the

possession of Right Reason; which, upon such matters, is

Practical Wisdom. The difference between us and Socrates is this:

he thought the Virtues were reasoning processes (i.e. that they

were all instances of Knowledge in its strict sense), but we say

they imply the possession of Reason.

From what has been said then it is clear that one cannot be,

strictly speaking, good without Practical Wisdom nor

Practically-Wise without moral goodness.