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The attempted answer of Speusippus, "that Pleasure may be opposed

and yet not contrary to Pain, just as the greater portion of any

magnitude is contrary to the less but only opposed to the exact

half," will not hold: for he cannot say that Pleasure is

identical with evil of any kind.

Again. Granting that some Pleasures are low, there is no reason

why some particular Pleasure may not be very good, just as some

particular Science may be although there are some which are low.

Perhaps it even follows, since each state may have active working

unimpeded, whether the active workings of all be Happiness or

that of some one of them, that this active working, if it be

unimpeded, must be choice-worthy: now Pleasure is exactly this.

So that the Chief Good may be Pleasure of some kind, though most

Pleasures be (let us assume) low per se.