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Again, no one would choose to live with a child's intellect all

his life through, though receiving the highest possible Pleasure

from such objects as children receive it from; or to take

Pleasure in doing any of the most disgraceful things, though sure

never to be pained.

There are many things also about which we should be diligent even

though they brought no Pleasure; as seeing, remembering, knowing,

possessing the various Excellences; and the fact that Pleasures

do follow on these naturally makes no difference, because we

should certainly choose them even though no Pleasure resulted

from them.

It seems then to be plain that Pleasure is not the Chief Good,

nor is every kind of it choice-worthy: and that there are some

choice-worthy in themselves, differing in kind, i.e. in the

sources from which they are derived. Let this then suffice by way

of an account of the current maxims respecting Pleasure and Pain.

Chapter III.