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But of Pleasure the whole nature is complete at any given moment:

it is plain then that Pleasure and Movement must be different

from one another, and that Pleasure belongs to the class of

things whole and complete. And this might appear also from the

impossibility of moving except in a definite time, whereas there

is none with respect to the sensation of Pleasure, for what

exists at the very present moment is a kind of "whole."

From these considerations then it is plain that people are not

warranted in saying that Pleasure is a Movement or a Generation:

because these terms are not applicable to all things, only to

such as are divisible and not "wholes:" I mean that of an act of

Sight there is no Generation, nor is there of a point, nor of a

monad, nor is any one of these a Movement or a Generation:

neither then of Pleasure is there Movement or Generation, because

it is, as one may say, "a whole."[11]

Chapter IV.