Pagina 589 de 734

However, this argument at least seems to prove only that it

belongs to the class of goods, and not that it does so more than

anything else: for every good is more choicewortby in combination

with some other than when taken quite alone. In fact, it is by

just such an argument that Plato proves that Pleasure is not the

Chief Good:[3] "For," says he, "the life of Pleasure is more

choice-worthy in combination with Practical Wisdom than apart

from it; but, if the compound better then simple Pleasure cannot

be the Chief Good; because the very Chief Good cannot by any

addition become choice-worthy than it is already:" and it is

obvious that nothing else can be the Chief Good, which by

combination with any of the things in themselves good comes to be

more choice-worthy.

What is there then of such a nature? (meaning, of course, whereof

we can partake; because that which we are in search of must be

such).