第703页 / 共734页

[9] It may be fairly presumed that Aristotle would not thus have

varied his phrase without some real difference of meaning. That

difference is founded, I think, on the two senses of [Greek:

orexis] before alluded to (note, p. 53, l. 33). The first impulse

of the mind towards Action may be given either by a vague desire

or by the suggestion of Reason. The vague desire passing through

the deliberate stage would issue in Moral Choice. Reason must

enlist the Will before any Action can take place.

Reason ought to be the originator in all cases, as Bishop Butler

observes that Conscience should be. If this were so, every act of

Moral Choice would be [Greek: orektikos nous].

But one obvious function of the feelings and passions in our

composite nature is to instigate Action, when Reason and

Conscience by themselves do not: so that as a matter of fact our

Moral Choice is, in general, fairly described as [Greek: orexis

dianoetike]. See Bishop Butler's Sermon II. and the First upon

Compassion.